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Abstract 
 
Collaborative approaches to local economic development have developed in a 
number of European countries.  However collaborative working presents a new 
problem for policy makers and public management researchers.  The problem is to 
design an institutional framework for the governance of economic development that 
provides for anchorage in the democratic system without loosing the benefits of 
flexible policy design and delivery. This is particularly important in a European 
context.  The European Union has recognised the need for citizens to be more 
engaged in the governance of public policy at all scales - from local neighbourhoods 
to the transnational level.  This chapter addresses the problem by examining the basic 
questions that any form of democratic governance design needs to address, and 
relating this to the case of economic development.  The core democratic design 
questions are: How can legitimacy be secured? In what ways can relevant publics 
give consent to decisions?  Through what means can the institution be held to 
account?  The chapter discusses these three democratic imperatives and shows that 
different responses to these produce three archetypical governance designs - club, 
agency and polity.  We then explore the way in which the problems of democratic 
governance have been solved empirically through longitudinal case studies of the 
expansion of Mainport Rotterdam and the management of economic, environmental, 
residential and transportation agendas in the Ghent canal area of the Flanders 
region of Belgium.  The analysis shows that although different national and regional 
political contexts matter, the typology of archetypes offers a way of understanding the 
overall democratic orientation of a particular governance design as well as offering a 
basis from which policy makers can create their own solutions.   
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Collaborative approaches to local economic development have developed in a number 
of European countries.  These take economic development from within public 
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bureaucracies and relocate it to new organisational forms based on co-production 
between government and business, sometimes with the additional involvement of civil 
society associations and citizens.  The resulting structures include quasi-autonomous 
public agencies, public-private partnership companies, multi-organisational boards, 
and community-based organisations for neighbourhood regeneration, often operating 
in a multi-level environment of overlapping jurisdictions (Ansell 2000; Heinelt and 
Kübler 2005; Sullivan and Skelcher 2002).  The rationale for taking economic 
development out of the public bureaucracy is that it enables greater flexibility in 
approach because of the reduction of direct political oversight, and enhances policy 
design and implementation because of the engagement of non-state actors. 
 
However collaborative working presents a new problem for policy makers and public 
management researchers.  The problem is to design an institutional framework for the 
governance of economic development that provides for anchorage in the democratic 
system without loosing the benefits of flexible policy design and delivery.  In other 
words, we need to find a way of ensuring that the public interest is represented in 
collaborative economic development but does not detract from the involvement of 
business and civil society actors.   
 
This is particularly important in a European context.  The European Union has 
recognised the need for citizens to be more engaged in the governance of public 
policy at all scales - from local neighbourhoods to the transnational level.  This is 
reflected in the adoption of the partnership principal in EU structural fund 
programmes (Marshall 2005; Bache and Olsson 2001).  In addition, central and 
eastern European states are emerging democracies and face a number of challenges in 
developing and sustaining a democratic infrastructure.  Public-private partnerships 
and other forms of collaborative economic development have been imported from 
western European experience, but need to be tailored in ways that support the growth 
of democratic institutions. 
 
This chapter addresses the problem by examining the basic questions that any form of 
democratic governance design needs to address, and relating this to the case of 
economic development.  The core democratic design questions are:  
1. How can legitimacy be secured?  
2. In what ways can relevant publics give consent to decisions?   
3. Through what means can the institution be held to account?   
 
For decades, representative democracy was considered the best (or least undesirable) 
solution to these design problems.  However the organisations being developed for 
collaborative local economic development operate at arm’s length to municipal or 
regional government, do not necessarily match a single governments’ jurisdiction, and 
include private actors and their interests.  Other ways of resolving these issues need to 
be found. 
 
The chapter starts by presenting an analytical framework.  It presents the three 
democratic imperatives of legitimacy, consent and accountability, and shows that 
different responses to these produce three archetypical governance designs - club, 
agency and polity.  The section shows how these can offer democratic governance in 
the case of collaborative economic development.  We then explore the way in which 
the problems of democratic governance have been solved empirically.  We report 
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longitudinal case studies of the expansion of Mainport Rotterdam and the 
management of economic, environmental, residential and transportation agendas in 
the Ghent canal area of the Flanders region of Belgium.  The cases demonstrate the 
evolution of democratic governance designs over more than a decade.  The chapter 
concludes with a discussion of the implications of the analysis for policy makers and 
academic researchers. 
 
2. DESIGNING DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS: A FRAMEWORK 
 
The development of new forms of governance to tackle societal problems like 
economic development has generated renewed interest in the field of institutional 
design for the democratic governance of public policy (Klijn and Koppenjan 2006; 
Skelcher, Mathur and Smith 2005).  In this section we elaborate the main principles to 
which the design of democratic governance has to respond. 
 
Principles for democratic governance of local economic development 
 
The analysis of governance designs for economic development start from the a priori 
position that public institutions in a democratic context have to resolve three basic 
problems (Skelcher 2005).  These are:  
 How to provide legitimacy for the institution and its jurisdiction 
 How to enable ex ante consent for its policies and expenditure, and  
 How to ensure ex post accountability for its actions.   
 
These three design problems are fundamental to the field of economic development, 
as they are to other spheres of policy, by virtue of the ‘publicness’ of the activity.  In 
other words, economic development involves the state (often acting in concert with 
other parties) undertaking actions that have positive (and sometimes negative) 
distributional impacts on society as a whole, or on groups or individuals within it.  
This activity is legitimated, consented to, and held account by democratic processes to 
the extent that it takes place through public bureaucracies directly subject to 
representative democracy.   
 
However the features of this policy domain mean that reliance on representative 
democracy is not sufficient.  This is because local economic development activity 
crosses the boundaries between state, business and civil society and involves inter-
agency cooperation between levels and departments within government.  The 
changing global economy also makes it more complex, requiring new ways to 
organize and stimulate local economic development.  The governance of this dynamic 
collaborative space requires new democratic institutions and new ways of managing, 
such as collaborative public management (Agranoff and McGuire 2003).  For 
example, cooperation between government and business to finance and deliver major 
infrastructure projects requires institutions that are able to accommodate the 
imperatives for public accountability as well as the constraints of commercial 
confidentiality that apply in the commercial sector.  Designing the democratic 
governance of economic development requires the questions of legitimacy, consent 
and accountability to be resolved in ways that complement or substitute the 
representative democracy model.  These three aspects of governance design are 
connected:  consent cannot be assumed or tested without accountability, and both in 
turn rest on the question of legitimacy.  
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Legitimacy, consent and accountability as design criteria 
 
Legitimacy 
 
The first issue to be resolved in governance design is legitimacy – the politically 
authorised capacity to act in a given jurisdiction (similar to ‘input-legitimacy’ as 
defined by Scharpf 1999).
2
   Legitimacy can be understood in both formal and 
informal ways.  The formal authorisation to act is inherent in the mandate of the 
institution, arising from the decision of a governmental body and the subsequent 
delegation of that authority to the new institution.  This delegation may take a more 
legal form in states ordered through Rechtsstaat or Code Napoleon systems (for 
example Germany and France), than in the more pragmatic and dejuridified nations 
(such as the UK and Denmark).  Here, authorisation may be more likely in the form of 
a decision by political office-holders or managers within a public bureaucracy. 
 
Formal legitimacy through delegation from elected government is necessary, but often 
not sufficient.  This is for several reasons.  Policy development, decision-making and 
implementation in economic development frequently involve a collaborative 
endeavour between government and business or civil society stakeholders.  It is 
necessary to establish legitimacy in relation to these other stakeholders in the 
initiative.  This will be particularly important in situations where government is 
seeking voluntarily to engage such actors, rather than legally requiring their 
participation.  There are a number of reasons for reluctance by business and civil 
society actors to become involved, including the perception that the initiative is not 
salient for their agendas or that it is tokenistic.  Legitimation by a high level business 
or civil society organisation (for example, a chamber of commerce or city-wide 
coalition of community organisations) is one way through which these constraints can 
be overcome.  Individual business and community leaders may also be mobilised by 
government to build support within their own constituencies.  Gaining legitimation by 
other parties may be reflected in a joint statement announcing their support for the 
new institution, the use of multiple logos on publicity material and the commitment of 
political, financial or human resources.   
 
Usually one can find some evidence of formal legitimacy in most of the governance 
forms, as we will see later in the case studies. However because most governance 
forms for economic development are rather complex in the sense that they involve 
many actors, complex interaction patterns and complex institutional regimes 
(Koppenjan and Klijn 2004) this formal legitimacy is only of relative importance and 
mainly at a limited number of moments in decision-making.  That makes the two 
other principles for democratic governance more important than in more classical 
decision-making processes. 
 
Formal legitimation thus is only one part of the equation.  Informal legitimation is 
subtler, and reflects the willingness or commitment of individuals, groups and 
organisations to engage with the initiative once high-level decision-makers have 
announced its creation.  Implementation theory demonstrates that legitimacy is more 
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dependent on sustaining a regime of support from relevant actors than formal 
authorisation by high-level actors.  The initiative will need to be seen as legitimate by 
actors at the operational level, for example civil society organisations invited to 
contract to deliver aspects of the economic development programme, and by target 
groups, for example small-business entrepreneurs or unemployed people to whom the 
programmes are directed.  Informal legitimisation may be gained through the 
application of incentives such as grants-in-aid or externally recognised awards.   
 
Formal legitimation is most significant in terms of democratic considerations.  This is 
the decision that government and other stakeholders will be held accountable for by 
their constituencies.  Informal legitimation is more to do with the operational 
implementation of the programme, and the capacity to deliver the expected results 
(similar to ‘output-legitimacy’ as defined by Scharpf 1999).  Such legitimation is 
instrumental; it is only relevant to the extent that it enables delivery agents or 
recipients to fulfil the functions expected of them by the programme.  
 
Consent 
 
The second element in governance design is consent.  Consent focuses on the 
processes through which citizens (and the constituents of other partner agencies) are 
able to exercise voice and judgement on the proposals, policies and decisions of the 
institution.  It is a measure of both the procedural quality of the governance of the 
institution and the substantive distributional consequences of its decisions.  The 
distinction between legitimacy and consent is that the former is about authorising a 
general capacity to act, while the latter concerns the specific actions proposed by the 
institution, so is more of a process-oriented nature.   
 
Local economic development institutions need to answer three design questions: (a) 
which issues they will offer for consent, (b) the processes by which consent will be 
sought and (c) the status accorded to citizen and stakeholder voices in relation to those 
of the institution’s own board.   
 
The first question concerns what issues will be offered for consent.  There can be an 
assumption that consent is not required, because local economic development 
institutions are established precisely to by-pass political processes of decision-taking 
in government because they are perceived to be cumbersome and time consuming.  
However this is to privilege a managerial view over the need for effective democratic 
safeguards at both the input and output stages of the policy process.  Economic 
development institutions are undertaking a public purpose, and thus it is important 
that relevant stakeholders are engaged in a process of consent giving on key policy 
and implementation choices.   
 
The second question is the mechanisms for consent.  Consent in a representative 
democracy is indirectly affected by citizens, through the judgements of those they 
elect to the legislature or (in presidential systems) the executive.  The basis of such a 
system of democracy is that the popular will is only expressed intermittently in the 
election of representatives, and is not engaged in relation to specific policy proposals 
unless there are provisions for referenda.  The rethinking of modes of democracy in 
recent years has opened up new possibilities for the process of consent.  These include 
various schemes for deliberative democracy (for example citizens juries and 
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deliberative conferences), participative democracy (for example through direct citizen 
engagement in policy making), and interactive decision-making (including the use of 
e-democracy).   
 
Finally, there is the question of the status of views obtained.  Choices need to be made 
about the extent to which consent giving is in relation to general principles to be 
followed by the institution (for example, to ensure its programmes reach all sections 
of the community) and more detailed decisions.  A choice may be made to require 
stakeholder consent to the former to be mandatory, but for the board to retain the right 
of decision on the latter.  Alternatively, the nature of the economic development 
programmes may lead to a judgement that detailed decisions need to be open to 
acceptance or rejection by stakeholders, in order to assist with effective 
implementation.  These are the questions of veto power familiar in constitutional 
design. 
 
Accountability 
 
Accountability, the final component of governance design, has two dimensions: 
holding to account and giving an account.  The first dimension is the process of 
explaining the decisions and performance of the institution to relevant audiences.  
Typically, this will include those bodies that authorised the institution’s capacity to 
act in its given jurisdiction.  It may also include wider constituencies, for example 
users of its services or local business or civic associations.   
 
This process of accountability says something about how the institution understands 
its relationship to its constituencies.  Accountability expressed through a report by the 
board to a meeting of business members conveys one notion of community.  
Accountability through report to a public meeting says something else.  The 
dramaturgy of accountability – where report is given, by whom, whether questions 
can be asked, how the event is promoted and recorded, what impact it has on   
operations –are all part of the governance design (Hajer 2005).   
 
The second aspect of accountability deals with the ways in which the mandate of the 
decision-makers is reconfirmed, amended or ended.  Representative government is a 
design that solves this problem through a regular electoral process.  The entity may or 
may not have elections to their board.  If they do have elections, the ways in which 
the constituency is defined may be inclusive or it may exclude certain stakeholders.  
More common methods of determining board membership for non-majoritarian 
institutions are nomination or appointment by a stakeholder organisation (for 
example, a chamber of commerce or community organisation), or selection by the 
board itself.  Each method has different implications for the process by which the 
civic community and the institution’s ‘members’ can hold the board collectively and 
individually to account.  
 
A typology of democratic governance designs 
 
We can develop a typology based on different responses to the three challenges for 
democratic governance design.  This draws on research on collaborative public 
governance in England (Skelcher, Mathur and Smith 2005).  In this research we  
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identified three institutional archetypes.  Archetypes are ‘compositions of structures 
and systems given coherence by an underlying set of ideas, values and beliefs’ 
(Hinings and Greenwood 1993: 4).  They provide basic institutional designs, 
reflecting different choices in terms of the relevant underlying values.  In the case of 
local economic development, the archetypes give expression to different choices in 
terms of legitimacy, consent and accountability.   
 
The three archetypes are termed ‘agency’, ‘club’ and ‘polity’ (figure 1).  The agency 
archetype is a managerialist instrument for the delivery of government policy.  It 
reflects the broader trend in public governance to create quasi-governmental bodies, 
executive agencies and special purpose boards in order to enhance credible 
commitment for policy delivery.  It is managerialist in the sense that the institutional 
design accords maximum discretion to managers over the design and implementation 
of policy instruments.  This produces a ‘black box’ with respect to democratic 
safeguards. 
 
In the club archetype, democracy tends to be focused within the member 
organisations.  This neo-corporatist design privileges the leadership of constituent 
organisations over their memberships.  Leaders reach agreement through negotiation 
around the boardroom table, and their actions are influenced by and accountable to 
their memberships to the extent that there is a democratic process within each 
organisation or sector.   
 
The community participation archetype is based on values that promote significant 
democratic involvement in the institution’s governance.  This may include elections 
for board members and other developmental activity designed to create a political 
community around the institution.  Legitimacy, consent and accountability to citizens, 
beneficiaries and other stakeholders are integral to the institutional design.  There may 
also be separate legitimacy, consent and accountability mechanisms linking the 
institution to government where it public funding is involved. 
 
We now turn to the empirical cases, which we discuss in terms of the framework set 
out in this section of the chapter. 
 
3. DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN COLLABORATIVE ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT: TWO CASE STUDIES 
 
The experience of institutional design for the local governance of economic 
development varies across Europe.  France has a long tradition of public–private 
cooperation at the municipal level, while the UK has faced major challenges in 
transforming its substantial local public bureaucracies to a mixed economy of public 
and private actors.  The Netherlands has made considerable use of public-private 
partnerships for delivering local public infrastructure projects, in contrast to the 
predominantly public sector approach in Denmark.  Central and Eastern European 
states are having to manage the transitions from state socialism to a more plural 
political economy, and in the process develop a range of local public institutions in 
the context of pressures for democratisation, private actor participation in public 
services, and the consequences of EU membership (Brenner 2004; Hodge and Greve 
2005; Loughlin 2005; Marcussen and Torfing 2006; Osborne 2000; Pollitt and 
Bouckaert 2004) 
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The framework set out above can be applied to the empirical cases of governance 
institutions.  For illustrative purposes, the chapter briefly examines case studies from 
in the Flanders region of Belgium and the Netherlands.  These two cases were 
selected because they provide longitudinal analysis of the evolution of governance for 
economic development.  Longitudinal analysis is particularly important for this field 
of study, because governance forms beyond representative government tend to 
operate within a more flexible and adaptive institutional context (Lowndes and 
Skelcher 1998).  Their design is subject to negotiation between relevant stakeholders 
to a greater extent than is the case in the more deeply embedded structures of 
legitimacy, consent and accountability found in the institutions of elected government.  
Longitudinal analysis provides an opportunity to understand the way in which 
governance is constructed by actors in terms of both institutional hardware (formal 
rules and structures) and institutional software (the practices taking place around and 
within the hardware) (Skelcher, Mathur and Smith 2005). 
 
Case 1: Development of Ghent Canal, Flanders 
 
The first case analyses the long-term evolution of a governance network engaged with 
economic development, environmental management and spatial planning in the Ghent 
canal area of the Flanders region of Belgium (ROM-Ghent
3
) (De Rynck and Voets 
2006; Voets and De Rynck 2006).  The spatial development of the area had evolved in 
an uncoordinated way.  This highlighted the tensions between the different uses of the 
area – as a major industrial centre, residential zone, environmentally sensitive 
landscape, and transport route - and by the early 1990s it was clear that a more unified 
approach was required. 
 
The project grew from the bottom-up: ‘It began as a relatively informal, inter-personal 
relational framework that expanded over the years.’ (De Rynck and Voets 2006: 66).  
It gained legitimacy from its origins in initiatives by these local actors to address a 
series of interlinked and highly significant problems that existing governance 
mechanisms had failed to resolve, and where there was no prospect of further 
progress.  From its start in 1993 until 1996, the network consisted of a small group of 
public officials and planners who operated on an informal basis.  Consent was dealt 
with through building shared commitment by their agencies, and after 1997 by the 
introduction of other actors with a shared interest in the strategic plans that were 
developed.  De Rynck and Voets show that this was reinforced by two factors.  First, 
the high degree of interdependency between the actors in this crowded institutional 
space where all levels of government are automatically involved.  Secondly, they 
regularly interact in different governance arenas on different issues. 
 
From 1997 to 2003 the network used a more formalised Steering Committee to 
provide explicit consent and accountability mechanisms and to coordinate the projects 
implemented by partner agencies and a specially created public company.  In 2003 the 
governance design was changed to create more effective ways of making decisions 
and coordinating implementation.  The Steering Committee was replaced by a Sub-
Regional Network, which operated through a number of working groups.  In addition, 
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greater civil society participation in the governance of the initiative was gradually 
introduced, by setting up and supporting citizen groups that also have representatives 
in the Sub-Regional Network.  This gradual formalisation of ROM-Ghent had 
developed in response to the increasing role of the initiative.  The revised design 
offers enhanced legitimacy, consent and accountability mechanisms at the general 
level, as well as strengthening those within the policy sectors covered by ROM-
Ghent.   
 
There are some important features of the context for ROM-Ghent that impact on 
legitimacy, consent and accountability.  The first point concerns the role of elected 
politicians.  De Rynck and Voets report that the whole process has been steered by a 
small group that includes key local government executive politicians and the 
Provincial Governor.  These politicians and a small staff of civil servants operate as 
‘central network brokers’ (De Rynck and Voets 2006: 67) and provide a point for 
legitimating the endeavour and enabling consent and accountability, even though as a 
group they are not recognised within the formal governance structure of ROM-Ghent. 
 
Secondly, political parties are important in securing consent to decisions by 
institutions of representative government associated with ROM-Ghent.  Political 
parties in Belgium play a key role in oiling the wheels of public policy making, 
especially where it involves lobbying the various tiers of government.  They are often 
highly competitive.  However De Rynck and Voets report that in the case of ROM-
Ghent there was cross-party support, enabling those steering the ROM-Ghent decision 
process to undertake lobbying by utilising whichever political party was best suited to 
obtain the desired results.  However this also enabled ROM to sustain its legitimacy 
with political parties. 
 
Third, the organisation of government in Flanders is inadequate to resolve complex 
area-based problems that require multi-level solutions.  De Rynck and Voets show 
that representative democracy has been unable to motivate the creation of effective 
governance arrangements, leaving a space that informal and semi-formal networks 
like ROM can fill without fear of being defined as non-legitimate. 
 
Finally, the institutional complexity of Flanders and the informal interdependencies of 
the actors in ROM led to ambiguity about accountability.  For example, the Provincial 
Governor and civil servants played an active role in ROM, while the Provincial 
Council as a political assembly was largely a passive participant.  The high degree of 
project responsibility by individual actors also creates ambiguity about where 
accountability lies, in relation to the former Steering Committee or current Sub-
Regional Network.  This ambiguity can be seen as an unintended but positive feature 
of the design in terms of sustaining the governance network and enabling effective 
planning and implementation, and may also meet the requirements for democratic 
anchorage in the Belgian context. 
 
Case study 2: Expansion of Mainport Rotterdam  
 
The second case analyses the decision-making processes involved in determining 
plans for the expansion of Rotterdam harbour during the period 1990-2004 (Klijn and 
Koppenjan 2000; Teisman and Klijn 2002; Gils van and Klijn 2007).  Rotterdam is 
one of the major European ports, and is also of significant economic importance to the 
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Netherlands.  Plans for its expansion emerged in the 1980s, and developed through 
three decision-making rounds from 1990 to the early 2000s.  The issues connected to 
the expansion of the port have a regional dimension, crossing several municipal 
jurisdictions.  They also involve conflicting values, for example because economic 
and environmental demands.  As a result, several democratic governance designs 
were used over the time to cope with the complexity of the decision-making process: 
 
1. ROM-Rijnmond design during the period 1990-1995: The ROM 
arrangement was a loosely coupled cooperation between several public 
actors in the region (two ministries, the province, 15 mayors and some 
regional authorities). Its purpose was to develop integrated economic and 
environmental plans for the region. 
 
2. VERM design during the period 1996-1997: This was a project group that 
was created by national government to organise an interactive decision-
making process about the necessity of the expansion of the harbour and 
how the wide variety of stakeholders should be included. 
 
3. The PMR design during the period 1998-2004: This was a formal project 
organisation created by national government to realise the expansion of the 
harbour, undertake the necessary environmental compensations, and 
involve private actors to achieve that expansion. 
 
The initial process – ROM-Rijnmond – commenced in 1990 and involved the 
development of an integrated spatial plan for the Rijnmond region within which 
Rotterdam is located.  It had a particular focus on ways of accommodating the need to 
expand the port.  The activity was legitimated by an agreement signed by the 
participating local governments, provincial government, national ministries, public 
authorities and regional economic agencies.  The approach to integrated area spatial 
planning was also legitimated by national government, which applied the concept in 
eleven regions including Rijnmond.  A project organisation was created to undertake 
this task, accountable to the participating organisations, which would also give 
consent to decisions on how the harbour would expand. 
 
The consent mechanisms involved reporting the results of the ROM- Rijnmond 
process to the participating organisations, including a recommendation that a new 
polder (Maasvlakte II) would be required in order to provide space for the expansion 
of Mainport Rotterdam.  Consent was expressed through a new agreement by the 
partners, signed in 1993.  A project team was delegated to prepare a report on the 
implementation of Mainport expansion through the development of the new polder.  
They reported in 1995.   
 
The significance of the proposed development led to a change in the governance 
arrangements.  The Provincial Council decided that the debate about developing 
Mainport would need to be conducted at national level, and in 1996 the Cabinet 
instigated an analysis in the context of its work on the governance of large-scale 
infrastructure projects.  The exercise had the aim of reconciling the demand to solve 
the spatial needs of Mainport with the requirement to improve the surrounding 
environment.  This legitimised the involvement of national government, but changed 
the scope of the debate as far as local actors were concerned.  It also widened the 
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number of actors involved, because the Cabinet adopted an interactive decision-
making process termed VERM.
4
   
 
VERM was undertaken by a project group of officials from four national ministries.  
They initiated a wide range of interactive processes to search out public views on the 
options.  Klijn and Koppenjan (2000) comment on the lack of involvement by elected 
politicians in the interactive process, which instead proceeded largely as a relationship 
between officials and civil society and business organisations.  They suggest that this 
went against the principles of shared commitment to a course of action that might be 
expected from an interactive process.  Thus, consent mechanisms within VERM were 
partial.  This becomes clear from Klijn and Koppenjan’s observation that the 
interactive arena had little connection with what they call the administrative-political 
arena where decisions were reached.  They comment: 
 
If we consider the final project decision it is especially striking to see how 
little of the argumentation and information from the interactive decision-
making process can be traced in the project decision.  It hardly deviates from 
the initial decision and the proposals of the project group (originally) set up by 
the Rotterdam municipality. (op cit: 372) 
 
VERM concluded in 1996, although a firm decision on the new polder had not been 
reached.  The Cabinet decided to start a third round of decision-making to advance the 
project, although in practice the lead was taken by a project group constructed by 
relevant national ministries, Rotterdam municipality, and regional and provincial 
authorities – termed PMR.  The core governance feature of this round was to attract 
private actors for the financing and realisation of the harbour expansion. This was 
legitimated by support at the national level for this type of arrangement, for instance 
from the Ministry of Finance.  A study of public-private solutions was initiated, but 
the consent mechanism, which involved agreement by various parties, resulted in the 
adoption of traditional contracting-out rather than a partnering model.  It appeared 
difficult to commit private partners before they were sure of getting the contract and 
difficult for public actors to loose their grip on the process.  So a design was chosen 
that still left much of the initiative and power with public actors and that fitted in the 
judicial tradition of the ministry of Transport.  This also enabled Rotterdam 
Municipality to maintain control of the harbour development, and the state committee 
responsible for spatial development agreements also wished to avoid too strong a 
private interest. 
 
The problem of consent, however, was resolved by designing a process for 
negotiation between environmental groups, private actors and public actors on 
compensation for the environmental losses as result of the harbour expansion (Gils 
van and Klijn 2007).  In that sense the institutional design was an ideal type Dutch 
arrangement for consensual decision-making.  Afterwards, Parliament was highly 
positive about the negotiated result, showing that environmental and economic values 
could be reconciled. 
 
The first point to be made from this case is how governance mechanisms for 
economic development change and evolve over time in response to the changing 
                                                 
4
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framing of the problem and the political arena in which the issue is located.  What 
started as a technical issue about harbour expansion became redefined as a matter of 
state spatial strategy for large developments.  This framing then became changed 
again, in terms of a decision on the appropriate mechanism for engaging private actors 
in the development.  At each stage the governance form was adapted to enable 
different forms of legitimacy, consent and accountability.   
 
Secondly, the case illustrates how parallel governance structures may be created, with 
contradictory legitimacy, consent and accountability mechanisms.  The interactive 
decision-making process within VERM was the public face of a dual governance 
arrangement whose private face was the administrative-political arena of 
representative decision-making.  These two very different institutional designs co-
existed.  However the interactive process, which in theory would facilitate legitimacy 
and consent for a shared decision, was undermined by the absence of politicians and 
their veto power in the administrative-political arena.    
 
Finally, the case shows that the underlying material interests of the municipality and 
other state actors, in relation to the income received from the harbour, constrained the 
form of public-private partnership used in the expansion project.  Consequently the 
analysis of governance design needs also to incorporate the analysis of underlying 
interests and the interaction between the two.  This two level analysis is also relevant 
for the examination of VERM, where political and administrative interests 
predominated despite attempts at an interactive process. 
 
Club, agency or polity? Analysing the cases as democratic governance 
archetypes 
 
 
The cases were presented through a discussion of the ways in which problems of 
legitimacy, consent and accountability were addressed.  They illustrate that the 
construction of these democratic questions and their solution varied over time in 
response to the evolution of the framing of the problem, the interests of actors, and the 
choices that needed to be made.   
 
Our framework also includes the idea of democratic design archetypes based on 
different combinations of approaches to legitimacy, consent and accountability.  We 
can draw out a number of additional observations from the cases.  Designs based on 
agency archetypes are evident in several stages, for example the project teams 
developing the initial Rotterdam harbour expansion and the formalised Steering 
Committee in the second stage of the Ghent process.  These are task-based managerial 
devices to deliver technical outcomes.  They may include politicians as members, but 
nevertheless are driven by implementation ethos.  The club archetype is the basis of 
the initial informal and inter-personal network in Ghent at the start of the process, and 
the multi-agency network around the Rotterdam harbour expansion at the local level.   
 
There are two examples of a polity archetype informing design.  The first is in the 
ineffective creation of an interactive decision process in the VERM stage of the 
Rotterdam case.  This was an attempt to open up technocratic and political decision-
making to civil society actors, and thus create a political community around the issue.  
However its isolation for the real centres of elected political authority limited its 
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emergence as an effective polity.  The second example is the Sub-Regional Network 
in the Ghent case, in which all actors concerned participate directly, including citizen 
groups of the canal villages.  The main problem is that the high degree of 
inclusiveness (over seventy actors) led to a hollowing-out of the Sub-Regional 
Network meetings because the group is too large to have in-depth debates on complex 
issues.  The Network then became a platform used mainly for information exchange.  
Hence, while a polity archetype was a goal in the Ghent case, the unintended practical 
consequences of trying to achieve one seem to have pushed it back into the club 
archetype.     
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The democratic governance of economic development is a rapidly evolving field.  It is 
a highly complex policy sector with a wide range of actors.  The necessity of working 
in complex governance networks that bring together government, business and civil 
society actors produces considerable variety in governance designs.  In addition, the 
governance forms evolve over time as policy agendas are framed and reframed, and 
contingencies motivate responses.  Questions of democracy are central to these 
governance networks for economic development because they shape, decide and 
implement public policy.   
 
However it is clear from the case studies and other research cited above that the 
primacy of politics cannot be taken for granted.  These institutions are sometimes 
tightly coupled to representative democracy, but at other times operate with a high 
degree of autonomy.  This creates an important question for academic research and 
for the practical design and management of economic development institutions: what 
is there relationship to representative government (Klijn and Skelcher forthcoming)?   
The analysis of real-life democratic designs provides a more informed guide to action.  
In this context, the typology of archetypes offers a way of understanding the overall 
democratic orientation of a particular governance design as well as offering a basis 
from which policy makers can create their own solutions.  The growth of networks, 
quangos, and other governance forms beyond the traditional model of representative 
democracy places demands on policy makers to create the best possible instruments in 
terms of the problems to be solved.  Archetypes draw out the taken-for-granted 
assumptions of policy makers and offer them a broader range of choices.  They offer a 
menu and a consideration of the likely impact of different design in different contexts.  
Research can help here, for example by elaborating the way in which similar 
archetypes may perform differently in different countries depending on the ‘politics of 
space’ within governmental and democratic cultures (Healey 1997). 
 
However it is important that designers of democratic governance for economic 
development test the assumptions they make.  Collaborative working in arenas outside 
public bureaucracies does not mean that democratic principles can be ignored.  
Legitimacy, consent and accountability are about ensuring that the public interest is 
reflected in the complex, multi-actor decision process.  The governance design may 
change over time, as the cases illustrate, but these basic questions need to be 
addressed at all stages.  This will ensure that local economic development policies and 
decisions are not dominated by special interests and the pressure for private profit. 
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The significance of cross-national research such as that described above is that it can 
contextualise these relationships, and enable researchers and policy makers in 
different countries to establish more sensitive institutional designs.  Democracy 
means different things in different countries, and there is a danger that governance 
designs can be taken from one context and transplanted into another with little 
thought to their relationship on the democratic milieu.  Researchers can help to 
establish the relevant conditions prevailing in countries and assist policy-makers to 
engage in effective and reflexive transfer of institutional designs.  This will assist 
governance designs to become embedded in the local context and supportive to 
relevant democratic norms.
 5
  
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
                                                 
5
 This is an agenda the authors are developing with Sørensen at Roskilde University, Denmark; Kübler at University 
of Zurich, Switzerland; and Justice at University of Delaware, USA 
(www.inlogov.bham.ac.uk/research/esrcdemoc.htm) 
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Figure 1: Agency, Club and Polity Archetypes 
Archetype Agency  Club  Polity  
Discursive 
orientation to 
democracy 
Managerialist: Democratic 
involvement by government 
constrained to setting broad policy 
goals, with substantial delegation to 
managers for the design and 
implementation of policy instruments 
Elite co-decision: Neo-corporatist 
structure in which government, 
business and civil society leaders of 
stakeholder organisations reach 
agreements in behalf of their 
memberships; the democratic 
involvement of members is only 
within their own organisation, not at 
the level of the governance 
institution 
Community participation: Extensive 
democratic involvement by 
stakeholders, beneficiaries and 
citizens in policy formulation, 
decision-making and implementation 
Focus Implementation of government 
policy top down 
Mutual benefits for participating 
government, business and civil 
society organisations 
Creation of political community that 
can authoritatively allocate values  
Legitimacy From government through political 
or administrative authorisation, and 
occasionally legal sanction 
From member organisations From citizens, community 
organisations, beneficiaries and other 
stakeholders 
Consent Focus on strategic consent by 
partners/ government.  Limited 
operational consent opportunities in 
line with managerialist design 
By the leaders of member 
organisations, including government, 
who are themselves members of the 
entity 
By member organisations, citizens, 
beneficiaries, community 
organisations, etc.; by government 
especially where public financing 
involved 
Accountability To government through performance 
management systems 
To member organisations, including 
government, in terms of self-
interested benefits of decisions 
To member organisations, citizens, 
beneficiaries, community 
organisations, etc. in terms of 
procedural as well as substantive 
outcomes; by government in relation 
to auditability of public spending 
 
Source: Adapted from Skelcher, Mathur and Smith (2005) 
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